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Depuis que la gouvernance compte, l‟Indice de perception de la corruption construit par Transparency 
International  (TI)  est  devenu  l‟indicateur  le  plus  influent  dans  son  domaine.  Chaque  année,  un 
classement est ainsi établi, pointant du doigt les pays perçus comme les plus corrompus par les experts 
de TI. Cet indice est un outil puissant de lutte contre le fléau de la corruption, permettant effectivement 
de mettre une réelle pression politique sur des régimes « mal gouvernés ».  
L‟influence de ce classement sur l‟￩conomie des pays concern￩s peut ￪tre importante, rendant parfois 
plus difficile l‟acc￨s aux financements, qu‟il s‟agisse de l‟aide internationale ou des investissements 
directs ￩trangers. Bien souvent, il s‟agit d‟une double peine pour des populations d￩jà victimes au 
quotidien de services publics gangrenés par la corruption et le clientélisme. 
La mesure de la corruption, à l‟image des différents outils mis en place pour évaluer la gouvernance, 
est  une  mesure  qualitative,  issue  de  perceptions.  Comme  toute  perception,  elle  est  sujette  à  la 
disponibilit￩ de l‟information et subit l‟influence des médias. Nos analyses ont montré que le niveau 
de liberté de la presse pouvait avoir une influence importante sur ces perceptions, pénalisant les jeunes 
démocraties et l‟ouverture progressive des médias.  
 
Abstract: 
Transparency International‟s annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) has become the single most 
effective advocacy tool in the global fight against fraud, embezzlement and other abuses of public 
office for private gain. 
Countries relegated to the bottom tier of the CPI rankings are not only embarrassed (usually), but 
penalized financially, as the stigma makes it harder to secure aid and investment. For any multilateral 
loan  officer  or  multinational  plant-siting  team,  checking  a  country‟s  CPI  rating  is  now  basic  due 
diligence. As well it should be: Corruption is a development scourge, acting as a stubborn brake on 
growth, a regressive tax on the poor, and - often - a corrosively effective enemy of democratization. 
Corruption  assessment,  not  unlike  governance  assessment  tools,  is  qualitative  and  the  result  of 
perceptions. Therefore, it suffers from the influence of information availability and media freedom. 
Our analysis, demonstrated that the media freedom extent may have a strong influence on corruption 
perceptions, penalizing young democracies and progressive media aperture. 
 
Keywords: Corruption, Governance, Corruption perception index, CPI, Transparency International, corruption 
measurement, perception indicators, press freedom, freedom house.  
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1.  Introduction 
Transparency International‟s annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) has become the single 
most effective advocacy tool in the global fight against fraud, embezzlement and other abuses of public 
office for private gain.  
Countries  relegated  to  the  bottom  tier  of  the  CPI  rankings  are  not  only  embarrassed  (usually),  but 
penalized financially, as the stigma makes it harder to secure aid and investment. For any multilateral loan 
officer or multinational plant-siting team, checking a country‟s CPI rating is now basic due diligence. As 
well it should be: Corruption is a development scourge, acting as a stubborn brake on growth, a regressive 
tax on the poor, and - often- a corrosively effective enemy of democratization. 
This naming-and-shaming tactic is a gift to domestic reformers in corruption-plagued countries, giving 
them  free  ammunition  from  a  respected  and  presumably  objective  international  source.  Poor  CPI 
showings become major global and local news stories, and potent political weapons against incumbent 
governments. And that‟s the way it is supposed to work. The ultimate goal of an advocacy organization 
like  Transparency  International  is  social  change,  and  the  media-driven  combination  of  domestic  and 
foreign pressure can be a powerful catalyst for reform.  
But  in  the  ranks  of  reporters  and  press  freedom  activists,  otherwise  sympathetic  supporters  of  anti-
corruption campaigns have long been disturbed by the CPI rankings. The reason is simple. These indices 
are often flattering to countries that do not tolerate independent journalism, such as Lee Kwan Yew‟s 
Singapore, or, further back, Gen. Augusto Pinochet‟s Chile. And near the bottom, we reliably find messy 
low-income democracies where corruption is chronicled daily by a feisty (albeit embattled) press; the 
many politically disparate examples include Bangladesh, Peru, Ukraine, Nigeria, Ecuador, Mali, Mexico, 
South Africa, Thailand  and Sierra Leone.  
The  question  thus  arises:  Does  a  perception-based  corruption  index  inadvertently  penalize  more 
“transparent”  societies  where  corruption  abuses  are  publicly  exposed,  and  reward  countries  that 
systematically suppress such independent reporting?   
 
Put more directly: Is the CPI biased against a free press?  
And, if it is, should anti-corruption and free-media activists try to correct this counter-productive skewing 
of corruption perceptions? At minimum, it would seem a question worth examining. 
This fall the CPI again made global and local headlines. Based on a synthesis of results from 13 different 
independent polls of business executives, economists and other mostly resident expatriate experts in the 
180 countries surveyed, the 2009 CPI put New Zealand, Denmark, Singapore and Sweden in the lead of 
TI‟s “highly clean” top tier, and Iraq, Sudan, Myanmar, Afghanistan and Somalia at the bottom of its 
“highly corrupt” category.   
In general there is a rough correlation between high or “clean” scores on the CPI and levels of democracy, 
which of course includes independent news media. Yet after subtracting the extremes – the rich industrial 4    WORKING PAPER N° 158 
 
democracies at the top and the war-ravaged societies at the bottom – more subtle and sometimes counter – 
intuitive patterns emerge. 
With the exception of Singapore, the CPI Top Ten are all wealthy industrial democracies – eight of them 
Western  European  –  where  political  systems  are  stable,  comparative  gradations  are  slight,  and 
information about corruption tends to be extensively and factually reported. The Bottom Ten are mostly 
functionally  lawless  conflict  zones  such  as  Somalia,  Iraq,  and  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo, 
rounded out by a xenophobic police state (Myanmar) and an oil-fueled kleptocracy (Equatorial Guinea).  
In the more representative middle, though, there are a number of other “outlier” countries like Singapore: 
developing  nations  that  score  high  on  the  anti-corruption  front  but  which  have  low  levels  of  press 
freedom. And there are also many where the reverse holds true: societies with functioning democracies 
that the TI surveys find to be highly corrupt.   
To examine this phenomenon, Jacqueline Brown, graduated student at Columbia University‟s School for 
International Public Affairs, was asked by UNDP‟s Democratic Governance Group to examine the link 
between Transparency International‟s CPI and the Freedom House Press Freedom Index. She received the 
support of Thomas Roca, PhD student at the Economic Development Group of University Bordeaux IV, 
specialized in Governance assessment. 
The  Freedom  House  press  freedom  index,  it  can  be  argued,  is  fully  as  flawed  and  as  dependent  on 
perceptions as Transparency International‟s CPI. Freedom House‟s critics contend that its rankings are 
further  distorted  by  a  peculiarly  American  ideological  prism.  A  further  problem  is  the  “J  Curve” 
phenomenon,  where  newly  democratizing  societies  are  characterized  by  great  transitional  turbulence, 
including attacks on a newly independent and aggressive press. The quantitative data on the jailings and 
killings of journalists that are incorporated into the Freedom House index do not necessarily correlate 
with levels of “freedom” – that is, a truly closed society has no real journalists to repress, and in newly 
open countries where the media is suddenly exposing wrongdoing and questioning authority the backlash 
against  journalists  can  be  severe,  and  violent.  But  the  trend-line  in  the  latter  case  is  towards  more 
freedom. 
 
Similar  indices,  such  as  the  annual  national  press  freedom  rankings  by  France‟s  Reporters  Without 
Borders, have many of the same inherent flaws, and are in any event of too recent vintage for long-term 
comparative purposes. Freedom House draws on well-documented data on press freedom abuses from the 
Committee to Protect Journalists, the International Federation of Journalists, Reporters without Borders, 
and other professional groups, and itself is a survey data source for Transparency International.    
 
And,  in  contrast  to  corruption,  press  freedom  problems  –  the  jailings  and  killings  of  journalists,  the 
closure of news outlets, state controls over media – tend to be visible and verifiable. While far from ideal, 
or perfectly empirical, the Freedom House indices offer the best available point of comparison with the 




Brown‟s accompanying draft discussion paper looks most closely at what might be termed the „outlier‟ 
countries. Singapore is at one extreme – consistently near the top of the CPI rankings and near the bottom 
of press freedom indices – and Bangladesh exemplifies the other, as a fraud-plagued democracy that the 
CPI ranked for five straight years – 2001 to 2005 – as the most corrupt society on earth.   
Bangladesh then suddenly lost its status as a democracy: Elected civilian leaders were toppled in a coup 
that the generals defended in the court of public opinion as a necessary step towards clean government. 
The stigma of the last-place CPI finish  helped make the  coup more palatable both domestically  and 
abroad. And Bangladesh was unquestionably riddled with corruption, both petty and grand, as a glance at 
any morning newspaper in Dacca would attest.  
 
But  was  Bangladesh  really  the  most  corrupt  country  in  the  world  for  half  a  decade?  And  does  its 
improvement  in  the  CPI  rankings  under  military  rule  wholly  reflect  reality  –  or  is  it  affected  by  an 
intimidated press pulling its punches until and when democracy returns? (Bangladesh is now ranked # 
139 in the CPI, tied with Belarus, Pakistan and Philippines.) 
Other clean-but-closed outliers include the United Arab Emirates, which does consistently well in the CPI 
but where serious reporting about local business, local government and the ruling emirs is rare;  Tunisia 
and  Cuba,  which  suppress  both  independent  local  reporting  and  internet  access  to  international 
information  sources,  but  which  score  better  in  the  CPI  than  more  open  societies  in  their  respective 
regions; and Hong Kong, where the press is freer than in mainland China but far less independent than it 
was  under  British  rule.  Hong  Kong  is  now  ranked  #12  in  the  CPI  rankings,  higher  than  such  open 
societies as Austria (#16), Japan (#17) the UK (#17) and the US (#19).  
Further, it is instructive to see why the UK and US rank lower in the CPI than most British or US citizens 
would probably have predicted. In the UK, campaign finance corruption allegations and corporate bribery 
scandals  were  cited  by  those  responding  to  the  survey;  similarly,  in  the  US,  dissatisfaction  with  the 
campaign finance system and corporate governance abuses were the major factors influencing perceptions 
of corruption. These issues have one thing in common: they were exposed by an aggressive, independent 
press. And campaign finance abuse would not be perceived as a problem at all if the US and UK were not 
electoral democracies.  
 
There are many other interesting contrasts: Sierra Leone, where the press erratically but openly denounces  
corruption,  is  near  the  bottom  of  the  CPI  at  #146, far  from  Gambia  (#106)  ,  where  journalists  are 
censored, co-opted, driven into exile, or worse. The freewheeling Philippines (#139) is ranked pretty close 
to tightly controlled Cameroon, and both are perceived by CPI survey respondents to be more corrupt 
than rigidly authoritarian Libya (#130).   
 
The Latin  American country which scores lowest in the new CPI is Venezuela, a country  driven by 
political polarization and where the opposition press has aggressively spotlighted official corruption. But 
is Venezuela really the most corrupt country in Latin America, by far, as the CPI would suggest? More so 6    WORKING PAPER N° 158 
 
than Paraguay, say, where contraband trade has been part of the economy‟s bedrock for decades? Or more 
than the poorest Central American countries, whose citizens are  victimized by the predations of tiny 
oligopolies and rapacious drug mafias?  
 
There is an inherent paradox in global advocacy work on good governance: The more open and advanced 
the society, the more responsive it is to criticism. Even imperfect young democracies have an internal 
echo chamber of media debate and political discourse, and this is often accompanied by real concern 
among elites and the general populace both for how their country is perceived in the world. Democracies 
like to be perceived as such. Authoritarian states, by definition, are far less bothered by the vicissitudes of 
public opinion, at home or abroad. If comparative rankings are used as an advocacy tool, the former will 
be always more concerned with their score than the latter.  
So if you are in the advocacy business, whether in the anti-corruption arena or press-freedom promotion 
or women‟s rights or anything else, does it make more sense to direct your fire against  an imperfect but 
responsive Bangladesh, or a defiantly impervious Uzbekistan? Against Romania, or Belarus? Indonesia or 
Saudi Arabia?  
This is the normal strategic calculus of advocacy work. Yet to the extent that perception-of-corruption 
rankings are perceived to reflect empirical reality, this becomes problematic  -- including for the anti-
corruption campaigners themselves, who have a vested interest in encouraging an independent media to 
act as an effective watchdog against fraud and other abuses of power.   
Common sense tells us that if you live in a country where there are daily headlines about corruption 
scandals and you are asked if the country has a serious corruption problem, you will (correctly) answer 
yes. Moreover, if there is a relatively free exchange of critical and even scandalous information in the 
society  where  you  live  and  work,  you  are  unlikely  to  hesitate  reporting  your  own  views  on  a 
questionnaire.  
But what about countries where these kinds of freewheeling exposes would be politically unthinkable, 
and even dangerous – and where poll respondents are resident foreigners who cannot afford to anger their 
hosts?  Would  you  be  willing  to  say  forthrightly  what  you  think,  even  if  theoretically  guaranteed 
anonymity? Would you wonder whether a frank response could if traced back to you hurt your business 
associates, or your friends?  
And there is a bigger parallel problem: Without some reasonably free exchange of information, how 
would you really know what is going on in the country, beyond your own first-hand experience and the 
anecdotal gossip of friends and business associates?  
Can outsiders invest and compete inside Singapore or Dubai without well-connected local partners – and 
if not, how are these partnerships arranged and compensated? How would we know? You won‟t read 
about in the Gulf News or the Straits Times. 




During the first waves of democratization after the fall of military regimes in Latin America and the 
Soviet  bloc  governments  of  Eastern  Europe,  ordinary  citizens  often  concluded  that  they  had  traded 
authoritarian repression for a new politics of free-market criminality. In part this was due to new forms of 
corruption, both petty and grand, all documented and denounced in newly independent media, plus street 
crime that would not have been tolerated under the police  states of the past and which now led the 
evening news. But it was equally due to deep public ignorance of the venal realities of the old regimes, 
where any attempt to investigate or denounce the corruption of the juntas or the politburos would have 
resulted in exile, imprisonment, or death.  
The  result,  too  often,  was  a  dangerously  misplaced  nostalgia  for  an  imagined  corruption-free  (albeit 
freedom-free) past, and an association of freely elected civilian leaders with scandal and greed.  
Which brings us back to Chile.  
Pinochet  and  his  regime  were  portrayed  at  the  time  in  global  business  circles  as,  yes,  brutal  and 
authoritarian, but also honest in its business dealings, in accord with its declared open-market principles. 
This  perception  was  reflected  in  highly  favorable  CPI  ratings.  But  after  Chile‟s  military  rulers  were 
replaced by democratically elected leaders, the media began to operate freely and critically. And within a 
few years investigative journalists were able to prove that the Pinochet government was in fact riddled 
with corruption, starting right at the top with the general and his family, who enriched themselves through 
kickbacks and deposited the funds in foreign banks in the manner typical of larcenous tyrants everywhere. 
The Chile story can be seen as a metaphor for this syndrome. At the very least, there is enough evidence 
to suggest that this is an issue worth examining, through dialogue between free-media advocates and anti-
corruption  campaigners.  Otherwise,  democratization  itself  could  be  undermined  by  the  mistaking  of 
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2.  The CPI and the Free Media Factor 
 
This paper examines the relationship between perceived levels of corruption and media freedom. In 
the first part, statistics methods were used to analyze a possible correlation  and the  eventuality of a 
measurement bias in Transparency  International CPI. A case  study and a literature survey  were then 
undertaken to deepen our findings. 
As corruption measure, we used Transparency International‟s Corruption Perceptions Index (2009). The 
Freedom  of  the  Press  index  (2009),  constructed  by  Freedom  House  was  chosen  as  media  freedom 
assessment. 
Research papers have been selected that can help determine whether countries with freer media may be 
adversely affected by survey-based corruption rankings. The broader implications of such a correlation on 
a country‟s reputation, as well as aid and investment flows, are explored in an effort to initiate dialogue 
between the media and anti-corruption communities on an important relationship that has been widely 
overlooked.  
 
A.  Measuring the relationship between media freedom and corruption perceptions 
 
There  is  wide  consensus  among  researchers  to  state  that  democracy  prevent  from  corruption. 
Roughly, it is argued that within the democratic game, “bad behaviors” - experienced or flagged in the 
media - are punished at the ballot box. As first verification, we need to check, whether or not, democracy 
and free media are strongly correlated. Therefore, we constructed a correlation matrix crossing two media 
freedom indicators and two democracy indexes: 
 
NB: Freedom of press Index sign is negative because of the inverse scale of the index. 
 
 


















Freedom of Press 
(Freedom house 2009) 




Sig. (2-tailed)    .000  .000  .000 
N  192  168  184  159 
Freedom of Press 
Index (Reporter 
without Border 2009) 
Pearson Correlation     1  -.776
**  -.724
** 
Sig. (2-tailed)       .000  .000 
N     172  162  161 
Political Pluralism 
and Participation  
(Freedom House 2009) 
Pearson Correlation        1  .866
** 
Sig. (2-tailed)          .000 
N        186  154 
Polity index 2008 
Pearson Correlation          1 
Sig. (2-tailed)           
N          162 




Chart a. Population perceptions and press freedom,  
Curve adjustment comparison: linear vs. quadratic 
Sample size: 143 countries 
A  B 
NB.  In  order  to  chart  these 
data  we  converted  indicators 
to a 0 to 4 scale. 
This table informs that, indeed, freedom of press and democracy are strongly associated. Freedom of 
press seems to explain about 80% of the variation of the selected democracy indexes (sample size for this 
cross country analysis: 154 to 184 countries). As expected, these results are pretty strong.  
After  having  observed  the  correlation  between  free  press  and  democracy,  we  may  postulate  that 
corruption should be a decreasing function of press freedom. Theoretically, we thus expect to find a linear 
decreasing relation between corruption perception levels and press freedom… however, the story may not 
be that simple… 
 
 
B.  Are perceptions biased? 
 
Perceptions are partly influenced by information disseminated in the media. This matter of fact may affect 
worldwide corruption assessments and bias indicators, to the extent that all countries are not equal in 
terms of press freedom. 
We suppose that population perceptions should be the most affected, considering that experts deserve 
their status, taking into account possible measurement pitfalls. 
To  illustrate  the  interaction  between  press  freedom  and  corruption  perceptions,  we  decided  to  start 
analyzing the role of media freedom in population perception of corruption. The data we used for this 
study  is  Gallup  Population  perception  of  corruption  in  Government.  We  constructed  a  scatter-plot 
displaying both linear and non–linear adjustment: 
 
 



















Free Media and 
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This first analysis informs that the observed association between press freedom and population perception 
of corruption is not linear but quadratic
1, thereby, it contradicts theory.  
 
 
2.  “n” curve: a quadratic relation 
To explain this quadratic association, we suggest that in the early hours of democracy (A), the more the 
press becomes free, the more it broadcasts corruption deeds and the more the population perceives it. 
Nevertheless, we suggest this rise in corruption perceptions is not the result of an effective corruption 
flood, but the consequence of media aperture, flagging more of these deeds. 
In the second stage (B) the perception of corruption starts to decrease with media freedom (or democracy) 
improvement. At this step, we suppose that corruption events, indeed collapse, followed by perceptions. 
We understand this way, the “n” shape observed. 
Our  conclusion  suggests  that  population  perceptions  are  clearly  biased  by  media  aperture,  revealing 
corruption affairs that were likely preexisting but not revealed and therefore not perceived. We therefore 




3.  What about experts?  
To  question  Transparency  International  experts‟  assessment,  we  used  the  same  methodology. 
Transparency  CPI  would  be  biased  if  the  adjustment  curve  between  experts‟  perceptions  and  press 
freedom is non linear. We display above the resulting scatter-plot: 
 
                                                             
1  Linear  adjustment  is  not  statistically  significant.  Quadratic  adjustment  is  significant  with  a  probability  error 
inferior at 1%. Therefore we don‟t even need to compare the R² to establish the more relevant model. 
Table 2. Curve adjustments results, freedom of press and population perception of government corruption 
Ordinary least squares estimation  Coefficients 
Quadratic adjustment 
Variables 
Freedom of Press   1.927*** 
t  (5.873) 
Freedom of Press
2  -0.488*** 
t  (-6.314) 
R²  0.232 
Adjusted  R²  0.222 
Number of observations (N)  143 
Linear adjustment 
Variable  Freedom of Press   -0.104 
t  (-1.408) 
R²  0.014 
Adjusted  R²  0.007 
Number of observations (N)  143 




A  B 
Sample size: 176 countries 
NB.  In  order  to  chart  these 
data  we  converted  indicators 
to a 0 to 4 scale. 
We  also  invert  CPI  scale. 
These  modifications  have  no 
















We do observe a non linear relation between press freedom and Transparency International CPI. 
As a matter of fact, the increasing part of the curve (A) is less pronounced than in the previous 
observation, suggesting a lower magnitude of the bias. This observation is confirmed by the regression 
coefficients:  
 
Nevertheless, the comparison of the R-square of the two models, informs that the quadratic one explains 
better the studied association: quadratic adjustment R² (0.548) > linear adjustment R² (0.426). 
Table 3.  Curve adjustments results, freedom of press and Transparency CPI 
Ordinary least squares estimation  Coefficients 
Quadratic adjustment 
Variables 
Freedom of Press   0.834*** 
t  (3.953) 
Freedom of Press
2  -0.351*** 
t  (-6.843) 
R²  0.548 
Adjusted  R²  0.543 
Number of observations (N)  176 
Linear adjustment 
Variable  Freedom of Press   -0.577*** 
t  (-11.368) 
R²  0.426 
Adjusted  R²  0.423 
Number of observations (N)  176 









Chart b. TI Experts‟ perceptions and press freedom,  
adjustment curve comparison: linear vs. quadratic 
Media or 
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Therefore we assume that Transparency CPI is also victim of a media bias. We used the word “assume” 
since a two variables regression does not establish a strict statistical proof. Indeed, we need to use control 
variables to statistically enforce the relation between these two variables. 
 
In  this  perspective,  we  constructed  three  models,  aiming  to  isolate  the  CPI  determinants.  As  control 
variables  we  used  population  confidence  in  Government  (Gallup  Database  -  latest  data),  the  Human 
Development Index (UNDP 2009), GDP (World Bank 2009) and population statements about corruption 
experimentation (Gallup, “faced bribe situation”). The data we used are described in annex 1. 
 
C.  Corruption Perception Index determinants 
 
Model (A):  
CPIi = α+ β1Freedom of pressi + β2Freedom of press²i + β3Confidence in Governmenti + β4HDIi + Ɛi 
 
Model (B):  
CPIi = α+ β1Freedom of pressi + β2Freedom of press²i + β3Confidence in Governmenti + β4Log GDPi + Ɛi 
 
Model (C):  
CPIi = α+ β1Freedom of pressi + β2Freedom of press²i + β3Confidence in Governmenti + β4HDIi +  
β5Faced Bribe Situationi + Ɛi 
 
1.  Estimations of the model parameters 
 
                                                             
2 Maximum of the VIF statistics (SPSS). 
Table 4. CPI determinants, model parameters estimation using Ordinary Least Squares method   
Model tested  (A)  (B)  (C) 
Variables 
Freedom of press  0.487**  0.393*  0.419* 
t  (2.278)  (1.777)  (1.737) 
Freedom of press²  -0.255***  -0.223***  -0.242*** 
t  (-5.034)  (-4.239)  (-4.305) 
Confidence in Government  -0.247***  -0.230***  -0.197*** 
t  (-5.136)  (-4.859)  (-3.566) 
HDI  -1.637***    -1.440*** 
t  (-6.413)    (-5.091) 
Log GDP    -0.589***   
t    (-6.720)   
Faced Bribe Situation      0.226* 
t      (1.702) 
R²  0.767  0.789  0.786 
Adjusted R²  0.760  0.782  0.776 
Observation (N)  137  132  118 
Colinearity test
2 (Squared variable excepted)  1.620  1.992  1.766 




2.  Conclusion 
 
First of all, we observe that our control variables display intuitive results: the more  corruption is 
perceived the less population trust their government; the more population experiences corruption, the 
more it perceives it. Furthermore, corruption decreases with GDP and Human Development Index. 
 
Regarding  press  freedom  and  the  CPI,  our  three  models  confirm  the  opposite  movement  previously 
observed.  Freedom  of press  variable  and  its  square  show  opposite  signs,  which  capture  the  rise  and 
plummet of TI expert‟s perceptions with press freedom improvement. In other words, it confirms that in 
the early hours of democracy, the CPI records more corruption than during the prevailing situation. With 
the aperture of authoritarian regime, corruption perception increases for finally collapsing once reached a 
certain level of media freedom. This way, it is possible to argue that the CPI penalizes press freedom. 
 
Nevertheless, cross-section econometrics is not the more accurate tool to identify such moves. A time 
series study would be more suitable to enforce this kind of bias. Unfortunately, corruption, media freedom 
and more generally, governance data are not comparable over time, as the methodology used for their 







3.  Outliers’ case study 
 
Why do some countries deviate from the linear relationship of these two variables? Is it possible 
that  repressive  media  conditions  and  poor  Freedom  of  the  Press  scores  may  contribute  to  decent 
corruption perception scores in some countries? Or, conversely, can a vibrant media (with resulting high 
Freedom of the Press scores) cause CPI survey respondents to perceive corruption as extremely prevalent, 
resulting in low CPI scores?    
Several Middle Eastern countries where critical reporting is  repressed or banned outright score quite well 
on the CPI tables; examples include Saudi Arabia, Syria(CHK), and the United Arab Emirates.  In Asia, 
Singapore, Malaysia and China all have corruption perception rankings that are vastly better than their 
media freedom rankings. In the Caribbean, Cuba‟s 2007 CPI score of 4.2 places it 61
st overall – not 
overly impressive, but significantly better than its 2007 Freedom of the Press ranking of 191
st3. This is in 
contrast to Jamaica, Guyana and Belize, all countries with considerable press freedom, where corruption 
is perceived to be high. While it may be the case that Cuba, with its tightly state-controlled economy, 
suffers less from petty transactional corruption than its Caribbean neighbors, it is inherently difficult to 
gauge, given the lack of independent reporting there.  
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Charting  the  relationship  between  media 
freedom and corruption perceptions is difficult, 
for  several  reasons.  Apart  from  the  flaws 
inherent  in  the  CPI,  which  have  been 
extensively noted
4, the CPI only dates back to 
1996.  Freedom  House  (FH)  began  its  press 
freedom rankings in 1980. Both TI and FH have 
changed  their  methodology  and  data  sources 
over the years. It is also difficult to identif y 
trends in CPI scores, as the methodology used 
by TI and its sources has evolved over the years.   
Transparency  Internation al‟s  limited  and 
variable  coverage  makes  other  observations 
difficult, such as whether adopting Freedom of 
Information legislation affects CPI scores. 
Media  freedom  indicators  have  been  around  a 
bit  longer,  with  Freedom  House‟s  Freedom  of 
the  Press  scores  dating  back  to  1980.  
Nevertheless, the relatively short time frame of 
data available is a significant limitation. 
 
 
A.  Can perceptions of actual corruption be influenced by media? 
 
A number of factors contribute to one‟s understanding and perception of any given situation or event.  
Personal experiences, social stereotypes, history, shared knowledge and informal gossip all influence how 
people  perceive  their  surroundings.    Perceptions  of  corruption,  Ivanov  notes,  “are  often  based  on 
„groupthink‟, hearsay, or generalized sentiment rather than specific personal experiences” (2007, 33).  
Research by Miller, Grødeland and Koshechikina found that there is a “large but variable gulf between 
gossip and general perceptions on the one hand, and actual personal experience on the other” (2001, 28), 
with differences in actual experiences being much greater than differences in perceptions.  
                                                             
4 For a good summation of criticism frequently leveled against Transparency International‟s Corruption Perception 
Index, see Knack (2006), “Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: a critique of the cross-country 
indicators”,  as  well  as  Galtung  (2006),  “Measuring  the  immeasurable:  boundaries  and  functions  of  (macro) 
corruption indices”. 






















Singapore  4  154  9.3  69 
Qatar  32  139  6  63 
United  Arab 
Emirates 
34  150  5.7  68 
Malaysia  43  150  5.1  68 
Bahrain  46  159  5  71 
Tunisia  61  179  4.2  83 
Cuba  61  191  4.2  96 
China  72  181  3.5  84 
Saudi Arabia  79  178  3.4  82 
Jamaica  84  15  3.3  15 
Belize  99  39  3  21 
Mali  118  51  2.7  24 
Guyana  123  29  2.6  61 
Ecuador  150  89  2.1  41 
Bangladesh  162  146  2.0  66 
Papua  New 
Guinea 
162  66  2.0  30 




Different factors- be it media or word-of-mouth- can carry different weights depending on the culture and 
country.  As one of the main channels through which the public gains knowledge of their societies, media 
plays  a particularly important role in shaping people‟s perceptions.   What media covers, and how  it 
chooses  to  cover  it,  impacts  how-  and  indeed,  whether-  people  perceive  and  learn  of  certain  social 
happenings.  When  people  have  little  direct  contact  with 
government  officials,  especially  those  in  higher  office, 
media is one of the few mediums through which people can 
gain  information  and  develop  judgments  about  them.  
Indeed, one of the few ways for the public to find out about 
high-level  corruption  is  through  the  media  (Miller  et  al., 
2007, 65). 
The  relationship  between  media,  public  opinion  and 
perceptions is extremely complex and not necessarily uni-
directional.  While media may influence public opinion, it is 
necessary  to  remember  that  social  values  and  beliefs 
influence  media  as  well.    The  web  connecting  media, 
corruption,  and public perceptions is  complex and  intertwined,  with  each  element mutually  affecting 
another
5.  Given their connection to other social factors, media influence is notoriously difficult to isolate 
from the social settings as a whole.  The CPI reflects survey results mostly from country teams, experts, 
foreign businessmen and local correspondents.   
 
As a result, when trying to determine the relationship between CPI scores and a given country‟s media 
environment, it natural to ask where these particular groups get their information, as it is likely different 
from the population at large.  For example, most of the foreign experts and analysts surveyed are based in 
major  cities,  where  media  is  likely  to  be  more  varied  and 
prolific
6.   Surveying foreigners does not necessarily remove 
the possibility of bias, which is commonly associated with 
local perceptions. How do media affect foreigners‟ perceptions 
of media?  How do those surveyed receive their information?  
Do they access local or international news sources?  Are media 
private or state-run?  How many different sources are available; 
for example, are there ten national dailies, or only three?  In 
what  language  is  local  media?    All  these  factors  could 
contribute to foreigner‟s perceptions of events.  Media likely 
affect foreigners and locals somewhat differently, yet foreign 
respondents  are  also  undoubtedly  influenced  by  popular 
perceptions  and  general  sentiment  at  large,  perhaps  in  some 
countries more so than others.   
                                                             
5See Nyamnjoh, who notes that media‟s effects on public perceptions are both “gradual and cumulative”(2005, 1). 
6 Wilson notes that independent media are most likely to be based in capital cities (2005,46). 
“claiming that one political 
regime is more corrupt 
than other is not an 
empirical claim.  It is a 
normative claim”  
(Krastev 2004, 50) 
“Any perception of 
corruption is 
questionable since the 
researcher cannot 
assume that the 
respondents interpret the 
notion identically” 
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1.  Corruption perceptions in controlled media environments  
 
Given the possibility of media being a factor when determining perceptions of corruption, it is worthwhile 
to ask whether repressive and controlled media environments hamper the ability of citizens to be fully 
aware of the extent and form of corruption in their countries. 
It is no surprise that repressive media environments are common to nondemocratic regimes.  However, 
the existence of low corruption in such societies is much less intuitive.  Secrecy enables corruption.   
Heidenheimer labels it a “conspiracy of silence that permits most forms of corrupt activity to have a 
frequent incidence or to become standard operating procedure” (1989, 163).  Democracy, which rests on 
openness,  accountability  and  impartiality,  is  fundamentally  contrary  to  corruption,  which  exemplifies 
selfishness and privilege (Caiden 2001, 227).  It has indeed been said that corruption will be reduced not 
through “more neo-liberalism, but more democracy” (Girling 1997, 173). Why, then, do countries like 
Cuba, China, Saudi Arabia and Singapore appear to observers to have much less corruption than many 
more open societies? 
Without rule of law or media freedom, incidents of corruption are often censored; investigative journalists 
are frequently harassed or threatened. Self-censorship, which is widely practiced by journalists fearing 
reprisal, may be even more frequent and powerful.  Political 
corruption, or any form of government criticism, is often a 
taboo subject.  Journalists often choose, then, not to seek out 
corruption stories, focusing instead on less precarious topics. 
Thus, “a country or its government might be very corrupt… 
without much media perception or knowledge of it” (Kotkin 
and Sajó, 2002, 29). Without media coverage of corruption, 
public  perceptions  of  corruption  may  be  questionable 
indicators  of  actual  levels  of  corruption.    In  addition  to 
corruption  going  unnoticed,  it  is  plausible  that  corruption 
could  actually  seem  worse  under  repressive  media 
environments,  as  suspicions  can  be  exaggerated  and 
escalated  through  rumor  and  gossip,  without  any  facts  to 
support or negate distrust.  
Because media is often a reflection of the society in which it exists, what media considers „corruption‟ in 
one society may be different than what media in a different society considers it to be, and may report it 
accordingly.  Differing  norms  and  definitions  of  corruption  in  different  countries  reflect  what 
Heidenheimer  terms  a  “‟grayness‟  of  attitudes  towards  petty  corruption”  (1989,  161).  What  some 
societies consider corrupt practices, others may consider perfectly acceptable. What Americans may view 
as  „fraud‟  or  „waste‟  in  their  country,  they  may  consider  corruption  in  another  (Kotkin  2002,  388), 
suggesting that corruption is a matter of definition and subjective interpretation. Perceptions of what 
constitutes corruption may differ in repressive regimes than in more open societies
7.  
                                                             
7 In Shifting Obsessions: three essays on the politics of anticorruption, Krastev notes how in the former U.S.S.R.,  
the „blat‟, or personal favor, was a common and tolerated way of getting services, but after the transition to a market 
economy and the end of communism, bribes replaced the „blat‟.  However, for various reasons, bribes carried a 
“Corruption thrives in rigid systems 
with multiple bottlenecks and 
sources of monopoly power within 
government”  
(Transparency International’s 




It is perhaps impossible to know for sure whether the public‟s perception of corruption is limited in 
repressive societies because of media‟s restricted coverage of corruption.  No two countries are identical 
in every way except for levels of media freedom, so reliable experiments on the differences between 
actual and perceived corruption and media influence are 
difficult  to  perform.    Additionally,  it  is  difficult  to 
measure corruption in retrospect, for example, comparing 
incidents  of  corruption  before  a  democratic  transition 
versus after it.  The data before democratic transitions are 
often  more  controversial  and  shrouded  in  secrecy,  with 
less  media  coverage  and  validity  (Krastev,  2004,  49). 
Whether or not corruption has increased in the post-soviet 
states  is  much  contested;  one  argument  being  that 
corruption itself hasn‟t increased, but the nature and social 
frustration of it has
8. 
When governments aren‟t accountable to the public, the 
only  thing  preventing  political  corruption  is  self-restraint,  or  threats  of  punishment  from  within  the 
government itself.  Perhaps some repressive countries are more self-disciplined and their CPI scores are 
more or less accurate.  Nevertheless, it must also be questioned what role the (lack of) media plays in 
shaping people‟s perceptions of corruption in these societies.  Is controlled media conducive to improved 
corruption perceptions, thereby indirectly benefiting repressive regimes? 
 
2.   Corruption perceptions in free media environments 
 
When questioning whether media environments can affect corruption perceptions, it is necessary to also 
examine countries with free media environments but high levels of perceived corruption. 
 
Free media is widely recognized as an important 
component  of  reducing  corruption,  as  increased 
transparency  limits  the  ability  of  government 
officials to abuse their power
9.  With reputations 
and  careers  at  stake,  the  increased  ri sk  of 
exposure theoretically discourages corruption in 
all sectors of society.  In contrast, “politicians and 
civil  servants  may  be  all  the  more  tempted  to 
abuse their positions for private gain when they 
are  confident  that  they  run  no  risk  of  public 
exposure  and  humiliation  through  the  media” 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
negative connotation, causing people to associate bribes with corruption more so than they did the „blat‟(2004, 61-
65). 
8 For more on this argument, Krastev‟s Shifting Obsessions: Three Essays on the Politics of Anticorruption (2004). 
9 A good overview of media‟s anti-corruption effects can be found in Stapenhurst‟s The Media‟s Role in Curbing 
Corruption (2000). 
“The real question is not whether 
post-communism is more corrupt 
than communism, the real question 
is why public opinion judges post-
communism to be more corrupt than 
communism”(Krastev 2004, 58) 
“The new openness and transparency, 
together with the new media freedoms, 
have also inevitably served to reveal 
corruption where it may have existed in 
hidden form before” (Anusiewicz et al. 
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(Transparency International‟s National Integrity Systems 76). Public pressure is instrumental to fighting 
corruption  (Caiden  2001,  33).  However,  even  while  free  media  may  be  instrumental  to  decreased 
corruption in the long run, it is possible that the immediate effects of a freer media may be to publicly 
expose corruption that beforehand went undocumented, making corruption seem more prevalent. Thus, a 
difficult  part  of  measuring  the  success  of  anti-corruption  efforts  is  inevitably  weighing  the  potential 
decrease in actual corruption against the increase in perceived corruption.  It is naturally very possible 
that a freer media environment may lead to decreased levels of real corruption, and be so reflected in 
people‟s perceptions, but the possibility of it affecting people‟s perceptions in adverse ways must also be 
considered.   
 
When media is free, corruption- if discovered- rarely escapes public attention.  Corruption coverage raises 
public  awareness  of  corruption,  shaping  perceptions  and  attitudes  in  the  process.    Corruption  is  a 
particularly sexy topic to which the media tend to gravitate, and “the media coverage of, and their attitude 
to,  corruption  in  general,  and  to  the  concrete  corruptive  action  in  particular,  distort  the  process  of 
perception” (Sik 2002, 108).  A study undertaken by Wallace and Haerpfer found that Czechs‟ perception 
of  corruption  increased  after  being  inundated  with  exposés  and  reports  of  corruption  (1999).  
Additionally, “regular newspaper readers in Bulgaria estimate the country as more corrupt than those who 
do not regularly read newspapers” (Krastev 2004, 56).  Stories that go uncovered in repressive media 
environments  will  be  spread  and  repeated  in  open  societies,  especially  given  the  rise  of  new  media 
technology
10. 
Scandals are greatly dependant on media to sensationalize them.  In order for a scandal to occur, there 
must be both an exposer and “channels through which to communicate the message” (Moodie 1989, 879).  
Indeed, an entire “scandal industry” has resulted from the strong investigative journalism of the last few 
decades (Blankenburg 2002, 163).   Do media-glorified scandals reinforce the public‟s perceptions of 
corruption?  If media highlights instances of corruption in open societies, does it contribute to “declining 
confidence in those in authority, especially politicians”, as Doig and Theobald (2000, 7) suggest, in turn 
testing the strength and effectiveness of new democracies?  
Nevertheless, just because media is free to report on corruption doesn‟t mean that they necessarily will do 
so, just as  they may not  necessarily be fair and  accurate in their  coverage. Media may under-report 
corruption because of national pride, or intimidation, or may over-report it because of partisanship or 
resentment (Sik 2002, 108). 
The content of media- for example, whether it is optimistic or fear-mongering- is just as influential as the 
existence of it.  In much of post-communist Russia, media were strongly skeptical about proposed anti-
corruption  measures,  which  created  perhaps  a  self-fulfilling  prophecy;    as  well  as  significantly 
diminishing public trust, media reinforced the belief that corruption is endemic (Coulloudon 2002, 203-
205). Media are rarely neutral; their biases and intentions must be taken into account.  Free media does 
not guarantee responsible, investigative or critical reporting.  Nor is it unheard of for media to over-
sensationalize scandals in order to increase sales (Anusiewicz et al. 2001, 86) or survive in extremely 
competitive media environments (Blankenburg 2002, 153).   
 
                                                             
10  Along  with  traditional  media  forms,  new  and  electronic  media  sources  contribute  to  “the  new  visibility  of 





For these reasons, the effects free media have on public perceptions and attitudes towards corruption are 
complex  and  indirect.    These  effects,  and  whether  or  not  free  media  inadvertently  raises  people‟s 




Case Study: Corruption Perceptions in Cuba and Jamaica 
 
Cuba  and  Jamaica,  though  similar  Caribbean  societies  in  some  respects,  are  distinguished    by    wholly 
different  political  and  economic  systems,  which  makes  comparisons  difficult.There  is  acknowledged 
corruption in both societies: Cuba’s informal economy is marked by petty corruption, as defined by the 
state,  while in Jamaica there are many reported instances of corruption involving  both government and 
the private sector. In the CPI, corruption is perceived to be less acute in Cuba, which received a 2007 CPI 
score  of  4.2,  than  in  Jamaica,  which  scored  3.3.    Although  several  variables  undoubtedly  affect  this 
noticeable difference in corruption perceptions, one notable difference between the two countries is their 
level of press freedom.  Freedom House recognizes media in Jamaica as ‘Free’, and it scored an impressive 
15 in the 2007 Freedom of the Press survey.  Cuba, on the other hand, has one of the most repressed media 
environments in the world; it is designated as ‘Not Free,’ with a bottom-tier score of 96 in the Freedom 
House press freedom survey. 
 
Do  free  media  contribute  to  high  public  perceptions  of  corruption  in  Jamaica?    Despite  several  anti-
corruption measures and initiatives in recent years, a general cynicism with corruption persists, with the 
public perceiving corruption to be endemic (Osei 2007).  Osei notes that one possible explanation for the 
high perceived corruption is the “wide publicity given to the phenomenon in the popular press, which in 
itself has contributed to anxiety about ethical standards in public life” (2007, 168).  The numerous scandals 
of the past 15 years, closely covered by news media, have helped instill a pessimistic attitude in the general 
public towards anti-corruption initiatives, which may be reflected in Jamaica’s low CPI scores. 
 
In contrast, the media in Cuba is greatly repressed, and media coverage of corruption is rare.  Does the lack 
of free media in downplay the presence of corruption in Cuba?  The government, or government-affiliated 
entities, own and operate all of Cuba’s mass media organizations, controlling the information imparted to 
their citizens (Diaz-Briquets and Pérez-López 2006, 118).   Internet access  is limited.  For these reasons, 
there is “very little systematic information on the level or spread of corruption in socialist Cuba”(ibid. 123).  
Due to the nontransparent nature of governance, petty corruption thrives(Diaz-Briquets and Pérez-López 
2006,  125).    Ruling  officials  reap  the  benefits,  and  go  uncontested  by  local  media  (ibid.).  Apart  from 
personal  experience  of  corruption,  citizens  have  little  or  misinformed  information  on  the  extent  of 
corruption in their countries, which bring the accuracy of their corruption perceptions into question.  20    WORKING PAPER N° 158 
 
B.  What could be the broader implications of media-influenced corruption 
perceptions? 
 
Although intended to be a mere advocacy tool, the CPI is often referenced when determining aid and 
legitimizing or denouncing corrupt or professed anti-corruption regimes.  If aid and investment levels are 
often  contingent  on  improving  CPI  scores,  could  countries  with  free  media  be  adversely  „punished‟ 
because of higher perceived corruption? 
 
With  the  importance  attributed  today  to  democratic  governance
11,  Transparency  International‟s 
Corruption Perception Index results in more than just a sense of shame or bravado.  The creation of the 
Corruption Perceptions  Index made  a significant impact both  on the development community and in 
newspaper  headlines  worldwide.    Journalists  often  “ignored  the  caveats  contained  in  the  index,  and 
interpreted it as measuring actual rather than perceived corruption” (Ivanov 2007, 32).   Even if it is not 
Transparency International‟s stated intention, the CPI is readily used by media, opposition and businesses 
to compare and analyze corruption levels: 
 
The Transparency International corruption index that was designed as a  
PR instrument was manipulatively turned into hard data on the base of  
which the new anticorruption policies started to be designed  
(Krastev 2004, 31- 33) 
 
Referenced  and  published  worldwide,  Transparency  International‟s  Index,  Blankenburg  claims,  has 
“gained considerable efficacy by exerting a powerful influence on credit conditions and by withholding 
the support for investments” (2002, 165).  CPI scores can play a role when deciding whether or not to 
invest in a country, or deciding between multiple countries.  Although difficult to measure, it is very 
possible  that  Foreign  Direct  Investment  (FDI)  is  influenced  by  corruption  perceptions  in  any  given 
country.  Galtung estimates that “A reduction in corruption levels by a single point on a ten-point scale is 
estimated to increase annual GDP growth per capita from 0.6 to 1.8 percentage points”(2006, 122).   
 
Democratic, transparent governance has become an increasingly important factor in foreign aid.  The 
Millenium Challenge Corporation(MCC), created in March 2002 by the Bush administration to oversee 
the  distribution  of  $5  billion  worth  of  aid  annually,  grants  funds  to  countries  demonstrating  good 
governance and economic freedom; the CPI is among the criteria used to determine eligibility. 
 
Unlike traditional aid organizations, the MCC is designed not to deliver aid 
 to a broad collection of impoverished nations, but rather to focus select- 
ively on those countries whose governments are deemed most committed  
to ruling justly, investing in their citizens, and promoting economic freedom- 
 as measured by a set of objective and transparent governance indicators.  
(Johnson and Zajonc 2006, 1) 
 
                                                             
11 See Ivanov‟s “The Limits of a Global Campaign against Corruption” in Corruption and Development: The Anti-




The  MCC  is  a  prominent  example  of  how  aid  levels  are  often  contingent  on  decent  or  improving 
governance indicators, including corruption indicators. Since the creation and rising prominence of the 
CPI, a number of observers have noted several methodological flaws of the CPI
12.  In an effort to remedy 
these  deficiencies,  indicators  have  since  been  created,  most  notably  the  World  Bank‟s  Worldwide 
Governance Indicator (WGI), which uses the “data sources used by the CPI, as well as 13 others not used 
in  the  CPI”(Kaufmann  and  Kraay  2008,  23).    Thus,  while  many  of  WGI‟s  corruption  sources  are 
perception-based, the scope and methodology is broader and more comprehensive, allowing for a better 
corruption and governance indicator.  The World Bank uses the WGI, and not the CPI, when determining 
aid eligibility.  However, the American Millennium Challenge Account, while using principally the WGI 
to determine aid eligibility, also considers  CPI scores
13.  The instant gratification of a ranking -based 
gauge of corruption, as well as the controversy behind it, have only served to heighten the status of TI‟s 
Corruption Perception Index
14. 
In addition to aid and FDI levels, perhaps the greatest   negative impact of increased perceptions of 
corruption is the decrease in public trust, especially when trying to develop democratic institutions and 
ideals.  If corruption is viewed as endemic in certain societies, this perception could affect the very 
functioning of government by considering all policies illegitimate and doomed to government abuse 
before they are even implemented: 
If a state is seen as systematically corrupt, the pursuit of objectives  
such as decolonization, empowerment, and indigenization, which may  
involve widespread wealth distribution, are inevitably viewed as illegit- 
imate acts of graft, punished by international investors and the IFIs 
(Bracking and Ivanov 2007, 298) 
 
Galtung, who was a founding member and head researcher at Trans parency International (Sampford, 
2006, x), acknowledges that the CPI “has become a stick without a carrot” (2006, 121); states have little 
to gain, but much to lose, with the now infamous index. 
In light of the potential impact that the CPI and other perception-based indicators may play in a country‟s 
development,  it  is  worthwhile  to  examine  other  variables,  apart  from  corruption,  that  may  influence 
corruption perception scores.  Kaufmann and Kraay note that although measurement error is a persistent 
challenge when gauging corruption levels, “the vast majority of existing governance indicators do not 
explicitly acknowledge the extent of measurement error present in them” (2008, 24-25).  The complex 
relationship between media and corruption may amplify this error, meaning that results should be taken 
with even more caution.  In this paper we suggest that media could be a potential influence on people‟s 
                                                             
12 Galtung notes that aid shouldn‟t be made conditional on CPI as it is unable to provide accurate time series 
analyses and that it is “subject to significant variance and standard deviation”(2006, 122). 
13 For a more detailed account of the Millenium Challenge Corporation‟s selection methodology and indicators, see 
the  MCC‟s  “Guide  to  the  MCC  Indicators  and  the  Selection  Process”  Fiscal  2008. 
http://www.mcc.gov/documents/mcc-fy08-guidetoindicatorsandtheselectionprocess.pdf  ;  also,  additional 
information on the MCC can be found at www.mcc.gov. 
14 Transparency International has produced other indicators, such as the Global Corruption Barometer, yet the CPI 
tends to draw greater attention to it every year than any other corruption indicator available. 22    WORKING PAPER N° 158 
 
perceptions  of  corruption.    If  media  biases  corruption  perceptions,  should  media  conditions  not  be 
considered when assessing perception based corruption scores?
15  
Another scenario that ought to be considered is whether anti -corruption measures ever impede media 
freedom. In order to seem less corrupt, and receive the benefits accrued with low corruption perception s, 
will a regime attempt to limit media dissent?  Do anti -corruption measures ever come at the expense of 
media  freedom?    Can  corruption  perception  scores  actually  reveal  whether  or  not  anti -corruption 
campaigns- or even broader-scale democratic development initiatives- are really working?  What is the 
main intention of anti -corruption conditionalities  -  to reduce (perceived) corruption, or to improve 
democratic and economic development on a much broader and more comprehensive scale?  
 
4.  Conclusion: A need for greater dialogue and reflection 
The purpose of this paper is not to answer questions, but to pose them. With corruption being extremely 
hard  to  quantify,  perceptions-based  data  may  perhaps  be  the  best  way  to  measure  corruption  when 
compared  against  other  methods  (Kaufmann  and  Kraay,  2008).    However,  they  still  are  subject  to 
numerous flaws, and people must be cognizant of the fact that numerous factors, including the media 
environment, may affect perceptions and judgments.  Are corruption perceptions in any given country 
affected by its media  conditions?   If so, how is this  recognized or accounted for in foreign  aid and 
investment decisions?   
 
Cross-discipline  dialogues  between  media  and  anti-corruption  communities  could  help  increase 
understanding on the unrecognized and indirect effects that media and corruption have on one another, 
including the possibility that free media may increase awareness of corruption, while controlled media 
may downplay the existence of it.  Increased attention to this relationship could result in more effective 
policies and a more accurate evaluation of both anti-corruption and media development programs.  A 
genuine  debate  on  the  relationship  between  media  and  corruption  perceptions  is  owed  to  countries 
penalized  by  extremely  low  CPI  rankings  that  could  derive  as  much  from  free,  independent  local 







                                                             
15 In order to receive MCA funding, countries must “perform above the median in its income peer group (Low 
Income and Lower Middle Income) on at least half of the indicators in each of the three policy categories and above 
the median on the Corruption indicator”(“Guide to the MCC Indicators and the Selection Process” Fiscal 2008. 
http://www.mcc.gov/documents/mcc-fy08-guidetoindicatorsandtheselectionprocess.pdf).  Two  indicators  in  the 
“Ruling Justly” category, the Civil Liberties Indicator and the Voice and Accountability Indicator, do take freedom 
of  expression  into  consideration.    Nevertheless,  these  are  only  two  of  the  total  six  indicators  in  the  category.  
Therefore, it is theoretically possible that if a country performs well in at least three of the other indicators in the 
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6.  Annex 
 
Annex 1. Data used 
 
 
Table A. Data used 







surveys  2009 








surveys  Latest available 
“Measure is share of people who believe 







surveys  Latest available 
“In the last 12 months, were you, personally, 
faced with this kind of situation, or not 
(regardless of whether you gave a bribe/present 
or not)? (Yes)” 
Democracy and media 
Freedom of the 
Press  Freedom house  Expert 







surveys  2009  More  information available at : 
http://fr.rsf.org/ 
Polity Index 




surveys  2008 







Freedom house  Expert 







surveys  Latest available 
“In this country, do you have confidence in 
national government?” (Share of the people that 
answered yes) 








data  2007  information available at : 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/ 






data  2007 
Current International US$, 
More  information available at : 





Annex 2: 2007 Scores for 
Transparency International‟s 
Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) and Freedom House‟s 












































Afghanistan  1.8  69 
Albania  2.9  50 
Algeria  3  62 
Angola  2.2  62 
Argentina  2.9  49 
Armenia  3  64 
Australia  8.6  21 
Austria  8.1  21 
Azerbaijan  2.1  75 
Bahrain  5  71 
Bangladesh  2  66 
Barbados  6.9  17 
Belarus  2.1  89 
Belgium  7.1  11 
Belize  3  21 
Benin  2.7  30 
Bhutan  5  62 
Bolivia  2.9  37 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  3.3  45 
Botswana  5.4  35 
Brazil  3.5  42 
Bulgaria  4.1  34 
Burkina Faso  2.9  39 
Burma  1.4  96 
Burundi  2.5  77 
Cambodia  2  58 
Cameroon  2.4  67 










































Cape Verde  4.9  29 
Central African 
Republic 
2  58 
Chad  1.8  74 
Chile  7  30 
China  3.5  84 
Colombia  3.8  57 
Comoros  2.6  48 
Congo (Brazzaville)  2.1  51 
Congo (Kinshasa)  1.9  80 
Costa Rica  5  20 
Cote d'Ivorie  2.1  68 
Croatia  4.1  37 
Cuba  4.2  96 
Cyprus (Greek)  5.3  22 
Czech Republic  5.2  18 
Denmark  9.4  11 
Djibouti  2.9  69 
Dominica  5.6  20 
Dominican Republic  3  40 
East Timor  2.6  42 
Ecuador  2.1  41 
Egypt  2.9  62 
El Salvador  4  42 
Equatorial Guinea  1.9  89 
Eritrea  2.8  94 
Estonia  6.5  16 
Ethiopia  2.4  77 
Finland  9.4  9 
France  7.3  21 
Gabon  3.3  69 
Gambia, The  2.3  77 
Georgia  3.4  57 
Germany  7.8  16 










































Greece  4.6  25 
Grenada  3.4  23 
Guatemala  2.8  59 
Guinea  1.9  67 
Guinea-Bissau  2.2  48 
Guyana  2.6  29 
Haiti  1.6  59 
Honduras  2.5  51 
Hungary  5.3  21 
Iceland  9.2  9 
India  3.5  35 
Indonesia  2.3  54 
Iran  2.5  84 
Iraq  1.5  70 
Ireland  7.5  16 
Israel  6.1  29 
Italy  5.2  29 
Jamaica  3.3  15 
Japan  7.5  21 
Jordan  4.7  61 
Kazakhstan  2.1  76 
Kenya  2.1  59 
Kiribati  3.3  26 
Kuwait  4.3  56 
Kyrgyzstan  2.1  67 
Laos  1.9  81 
Latvia  4.8  19 
Lebanon  3  59 
Lesotho  3.3  42 
Liberia  2.1  65 
Libya  2.5  96 
Lithuania  4.8  18 
Luxembourg  8.4  12 
Macedonia  3.3  45 
Madagascar  3.2  50 28    WORKING PAPER N° 158 
 










































Malaysia  5.1  68 
Maldives  3.3  68 
Mali  2.7  24 
Malta  5.8  17 
Mauritania  2.6  55 
Mauritius  4.7  26 
Mexico  3.5  48 
Moldova  2.8  65 
Mongolia  3  36 
Morocco  3.5  62 
Mozambique  2.8  40 
Namibia  4.5  30 
Nepal  2.5  58 
Netherlands  9  13 
New Zealand  9.4  13 
Nicaragua  2.6  42 
Niger  2.6  58 
Nigeria  2.2  55 
Norway  8.7  11 
Oman  4.7  71 
Pakistan  2.4  63 
Panama  3.2  43 
Papua New Guinea  2  30 
Paraguay  2.4  60 
Peru  3.5  42 
Philippines  2.5  46 
Poland  4.2  22 
Portugal  6.5  14 
Qatar  6  63 
Romania  3.7  42 
Russia  2.3  75 
Rwanda  2.8  84 
Samoa  4.5  30 
Sao Tome & Principe  2.7  29 
Saudi Arabia  3.4  82 










































Serbia & Montenegro  3.4  39 
Seychelles  4.5  60 
Sierra Leone  2.1  56 
Singapore  9.3  69 
Slovakia  4.9  20 
Slovenia  6.6  21 
Solomon Islands  2.8  30 
Somalia  1.4  85 
South Africa  5.1  28 
South Korea  5.1  30 
Spain  6.7  22 
Sri Lanka  3.2  63 
St. Lucia  6.8  16 
St. Vincent & 
Grenadines 
6.1  17 
Sudan  1.8  81 
Suriname  3.5  22 
Swaziland  3.3  76 
Sweden  9.3  11 
Switzerland  9  12 
Syria  2.4  83 
Taiwan  5.7  20 
Tajikistan  2.1  76 
Tanzania  3.2  51 
Thailand  3.3  59 
Togo  2.3  74 
Tonga  1.7  31 
Trinidad & Tobago  3.4  24 
Tunisia  4.2  83 
Turkey  4.1  49 
Turkmenistan  2  96 
Uganda  2.8  54 
Ukraine  2.7  53 
United Arab 
Emirates 
5.7  68 










































United States  7.2  16 
Uruguay  6.7  30 
Uzbekistan  1.7  91 
Vanuatu  3.1  24 
Venezuela  2  74 
Vietnam  2.6  77 
Yemen  2.5  80 
Zambia  2.6  64 
Zimbabwe  2.1  89 
Hong-Kong  8.3  30 
Montenegro  3.3  37 
 
-countries with only one 
available score (either 
Freedom House‟s score or the 
CPI score) have been 
removed from the above table 
-all above data, as well as 
additional data from previous 
years and country rankings 
can be found at 
www.transparency.org and 
www.freedomhouse.org
 